
FieldTec Journal / Building FieldTec
Design Beats
When a safety form fails, the usual fix is a memo telling people to try harder. We think the form was the problem. How small decisions about the shape of software change what a crew actually does, and why we would rather build the right path than police the wrong one.
Every safety manager has written the memo. The pre-use checklists are being ticked without anyone looking. The end-of-shift questions are being answered before the shift starts. Witness statements all sound the same. Please take the time to do these properly. The memo goes out, things improve for a week, and then the forms go back to what they were. That is not because crews do not care. It is because the form never changed.
The aviation world learned this long ago. Its own guidance on maintenance human factors treats "pencil-whipping" as a predictable result of time pressure and norms, not a character flaw, and it answers it with design: independent checks, procedures that fit the job, and systems that make the shortcut harder than the real thing.1 We think compliance software should be built the same way. When the data is bad, look at the shape of the tool before you look at the people using it.
“A rule gets argued with. A shape does not.”
Answer the question when it can be answered
A field level hazard assessment ends with four questions about the shift: was anyone hurt, was there a near miss, was work stopped, is there a concern. On paper they sit at the bottom of the same page as everything else, so they get answered at 7 a.m., about a shift that has not happened yet. Nobody is lying on purpose. Finishing the page feels like finishing the job.
In FieldTec the end of the shift is a second step on a record that already exists. It is shown at 7 a.m., locked and flagged, so the worker knows the assessment is not finished, and it unlocks a set number of hours later (four by default, set by each company). There is an override, because a gate with no way through gets worked around with a second, fake assessment, but the override asks for a reason and keeps it. Every time is taken from the server, not the phone, so it cannot be changed in Settings. And the time it was answered is on the record, so "answered ten minutes after filing" becomes a question a supervisor can ask rather than a suspicion.
Do not put words in a witness's mouth
Many incident forms offer quick-pick reasons: slipped, distracted, rushing, not wearing PPE. They are fast, and that is the problem. A worker writing a statement after an incident will often pick the option that is already there, and the investigation starts from a guess the form suggested. Our PIN (preliminary incident notification) and witness capture deliberately offer no reason chips and no leading prompts. It takes a little longer. What you get back is the worker's own account, which is the only thing an investigation can build on.
The evidence for this is half a century old. In 1974, Elizabeth Loftus and John Palmer showed people film of a car crash and asked how fast the cars were going when they "hit" each other. Other groups heard "smashed", "collided", "bumped" or "contacted". One word in the question moved the answer by nine miles an hour.2
One word, nine miles an hour
Mean estimated speed (mph), same film, different verbLoftus and Palmer (1974), Experiment 1.
A week later the same people were asked whether they had seen broken glass. There was none in the film. Of those who had heard "smashed", 32% said yes; of those who had heard "hit", 14%.2 The question did not just colour the answer. It added something to the memory. A form that offers "rushing" as a cause before anyone has said a word is asking the same kind of question.
The question writes the memory
Said yes to seeing broken glass a week later (there was none)Loftus and Palmer (1974), Experiment 2.
A finding has to go somewhere
An inspection that finds a cracked mirror and a checklist that records "No" next to a fire extinguisher both end the same way in most systems: as a line in a report nobody owns. In FieldTec every module can turn a finding into an action item with a named owner and a due date, and the item remembers which record raised it. One open item per finding, so the same problem is not tracked twice, and raising one is a deliberate button rather than an automatic side effect, so the list stays work that actually needs doing.
Built for the desk, or for the glove
What we choose, and what we avoidWhat we build
- Big targets that work with gloves on
- Forms that file with no signal and send when it comes back
- The end of shift answered at the end of the shift
- Witness statements in the worker's own words
- Every finding owned, dated and traced to its record
- English, French and Spanish on the same screen
What we avoid
- Desk screens squeezed onto a phone
- Forms that fail when the truck leaves the yard
- One page that invites answers before the work
- Quick-pick causes that suggest an answer
- Findings that stop at a PDF
- A memo asking people to try harder
The record is the record
The last piece is quieter. When someone signs a hazard assessment, they confirm the exact wording in front of them. If that wording is corrected next year, their record must not quietly change with it, or the document would claim they confirmed something they never read. So FieldTec copies the wording into the record at the moment of filing, and the screen and the exported PDF both read that copy. A draft says it is a draft, in the file name as well as on the page, because by the time a file is in somebody's inbox the banner is easy to miss.
None of this proves what happened on a shift. Somebody determined to cut a corner still can. The point is narrower and more useful: make the honest path the easy one, make the shortcut take deliberate effort, and make the pattern visible to the people whose job is to notice it. Discipline still matters. It just should not be the only thing holding the system up.
References
- 1 Federal Aviation Administration. Maintenance Human Factors, "The Dirty Dozen" (norms). faa.gov
- 2 Loftus, E. F., and Palmer, J. C. (1974). Reconstruction of automobile destruction. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 13, 585–589. doi.org/10.1016/S0022-5371(74)80011-3
Features described are in FieldTec today unless stated otherwise.
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